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Abstract
Truth commissions are a key part of transitional justice measures that 
allow clarifying the past related to oppression during dictatorship 
or the horrors of armed conflict. It is civil society that often plays 
an important role in promoting and pushing the mandate of a 
truth commission, ensuring transparent work and a widespread 
distribution of the final report and the implementation of its 
recommendations. In Timor Leste, the Commission for Reception, 
Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) was a United Nations–led initiative, 
implemented after the 1999 violence around the independence 
referendum from Indonesia. Civil society had a limited role to play in 
the work of the CAVR, not least because the truth commission was 
not perceived to be an instrument that brings about justice, the main 
demand of the community. The CAVR shows that without pressure 
of local civil society, truth commissions will hardly leave an impact.
Keywords: CAVR, civil society, transitional justice, Timor Leste, 
truth commission.
Resumen
Las comisiones de la verdad son parte clave de las medidas de justicia 
transicional que permiten esclarecer el pasado durante dictaduras 
o conflictos armados. La sociedad civil a menudo desempeña un 
importante papel en la promoción e implementación del mandato 
de una comisión de la verdad, garantizando así la transparencia en 
el trabajo, una amplia distribución del informe final y la aplicación 
de sus recomendaciones. En Timor Leste, la Comisión de Acogida, 
Verdad y Reconciliación (CAVR) fue una iniciativa de las Naciones 
Unidas implementada después de la violencia de 1999, relacionada 
con el referéndum de independencia de Indonesia. La sociedad civil 
tuvo un papel limitado en el trabajo de la CAVR puesto que ésta 
no fue percibida como una herramienta de justicia, lo cual era la 
principal demanda de la comunidad. La CAVR pone en evidencia 
que las comisiones de la verdad, sin la presencia de la sociedad civil, 
difícilmente tienen algún impacto.
Palabras clave: CAVR, comisión de la verdad, justicia transicional, 
sociedad civil, Timor Leste.
Volumen 11 No. 1    FEBRERO - JULIO - 1
Including and excluding civil society in the truth–seeking efforts in Timor Leste
91
Introduction
Countries around the world that transition from authoritarian regimes 
or civil wars to democracy have set up truth commissions to investigate 
systematic violations of human rights and overcome the perceived 
dilemma of truth versus justice (Langer,: 2015). Truth commissions can 
contribute to achieving many important goals in a society that tries to 
deal with its past evils, including the clarification of the past, getting 
the voices heard that were silenced and ensuring the no–repetition of 
violence. Truth commissions are defined by 1) a focus on the past; 2) 
an analysis of a systematic pattern of abuse; 3) a temporary existence, 
usually one to three years; 4) an official creation by the state; and 5) the 
publication of a final report usually with recommendations to the state.1
The right to truth has been established as a “fundamental, emerging 
principle of international human rights law” (Bisset, 2012: 18). This right 
is both individual and collective; rights–bearers are victims and their 
families as well as the wider society. It is, as Henderson argues, an insurance 
against collective amnesia: after the final report of a truth commission, no 
one can claim not to know what had really happened (Henderson, 2000). 
Truth commissions can be an exercise to establish a complex truth that is 
victim–centered and goes in hand with public acknowledgment toward 
specific occurrences. The assumption is that when truth is revealed about 
human rights violations, legal actions will follow, reparations for victims 
be established as well as institutional reform implemented. 
One important factor for the success of a transition is the pressure 
of civil society because it can work as a watchdog of government 
institutions, bring about attention to the media and allow for ownership 
of the process by citizens. However, in the international community there 
is still an implicit normative thought that transitional justice is universal, 
thereby ignoring local civil society organizations (CSOs). Although it 
is widely acknowledged that every situation is different, the “one–size–
fits–all” approach continues to be dominant. It is increasingly recognized 
that the “voices from below” need to be heard as well because otherwise 
1 Freeman, 2006; Hayner, 2010; Wiebelhaus–Brahm, 2010.
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key notions of transitional justice are undermined, particularly justice, 
truth, reconciliation, and healing (Lundy & McGovern, 2008). The 
power of domestic CSOs can play a key role for an approach that favors 
restorative over retributive justice. Moreover, involvement of CSOs can 
allow a needs–driven approach for the local context and not one that 
is initiated by donors. Ideally, a top-down and a bottom-up approach 
could exist at the same time, as developed by Lederach (2005: 78–81). 
And yet, participatory approaches are often paid lip service to, but it is 
not yet the norm by the international community to work with and back 
up grassroots initiatives.
Civil Society and Truth Commissions
Civil society has various meanings for different people and there is no 
commonly agreed definition. In general, civil society is often used in a 
celebratory way, linked to a hope of ownership of policies and ideas by 
citizens. There are three basic points to consider why civil society is an 
important part to construct a public sphere and in fact democracy: 1) 
issues that are important to all citizens and to the organization of their 
lives; 2) it is through communication like dialog or debates that citizens 
can relate to the issues of public concern and it gives them voice; and 3) 
states and other organizations serve the collective interest of the public 
instead of personal interests of rulers and elites (Calhoun, 2011: 311). 
Civil society is like an arena where people can help themselves and their 
fellow citizens through direct action in organized groups to achieve 
collective good (Edwards, 2014). 
In this article, civil society is referring to local and national 
CSOs in contrast to international ones. CSOs cannot be reduced to 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) because also faith–based 
organizations, community–based organizations and others need to be 
included. CSOs can build up capacity with the participation of individual 
citizens as long as they are autonomous and independent (Duthie, 2009). 
While civil society has often played an important role in the support of 
transitional justice mechanisms, it is usually in a weak and disorganized 
state after conflict (Brahm, 2007). Yet, it is CSOs that are recognized since 
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the 1990s to help improve governance and democratization (Paffenholz 
& Spurke, 2006). Commonly, civil society is referred to as the “third 
sector,” different from and independent of government and the market. 
Following Lynch, civil society is understood in this article in a liberal 
framework where it is questioning the norms and rules of the state and 
checks the powers of government (Lynch, 2008).
Within the field of transitional justice, Crocker points out that 
civil society actors are operating within at least three ways: 1) they are a 
“bulwark of freedom” against the state which is reluctant to open up; 2) 
they influence the state by acting either constructively in building up social 
trust and civic capacities or destructively by fostering revenge or resistance 
to change; and 3) they can support in the public realm the functioning 
of a democratic and open government (Crocker, 2000: 109–114). In 
short, CSOs can play a role in improving the effectiveness of transitional 
justice by supporting or holding the government to account through 
democratic participation. While civil society can push government and 
come up with critical and innovative ideas to improve the effectiveness 
and responsiveness of state institutions as well as transitional justice 
processes, it can only work outside and complementary to the state. 
Therefore, it shall not be argued that civil society is the answer to 
overcome all problems. Sometimes it can even act as a spoiler in peace 
processes and is described as “uncivil” due to its role in the promotion 
of hatred and division in society ((Paffenholz & Spurke, op. cit.). There 
can also be competition between CSOs for national and particularly 
international resources. Moreover, CSOs will not do everything cheaper, 
faster and better than government as it was believed in the early 1990s 
(Stewart, 1997). In fact, it is important that government on all levels is 
strong and has the ability to assume its role, which is very challenging 
in the reconstruction phase. Thus, not too much responsibility can be 
placed on civil society but it is the state that should continue to provide 
basic services (Paris, 2004). It would also be the role of the state to 
strengthen civil society that is often weak and fragmented after civil war 
or a dictatorship. Particularly in the work of a truth commission, Crocker 
suggests that civil society can play a rule in public activities in the rural 
areas, in the evaluation of the work, provide assistance to victims and 
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recommendations how to deal actively with the past and the history of 
violations (Crocker, op. cit.).
There are multiple functions for civil society in transitional justice 
processes, and particularly in truth commissions, overall ten different roles 
can be mentioned: 1) data collection and monitoring; 2) representation, 
advocacy and lobbying of government officials; 3) making connections 
and consultations within local communities; 4) service delivery and 
intervention; 5) acknowledgement and compensation; 6) provision of 
training and background material; 7) the provision of access to records; 
8) the accompaniment of victims providing statements in public hearings; 
9) the provision of support services; and 10) offering public feedback on 
methodology and impact.2
It is furthermore a variety of organizations that can be involved 
in transitional justice work, including human rights organizations, 
humanitarian organizations, victims groups, survivor association, 
lawyers, religious organizations, peace building groups and mental health 
associations (Duthie, op. Cit.: p. 12). However, in all these links that may 
be created, it is key that civil society remains independent of government 
and criticizes actively the government in its shortcomings. Having that 
in mind, CSOs are said to have an enormous potential in transitional 
justice processes and can serve as a watchdog against corruption and for 
good governance (Amaya & Langer, 2015). After all, as de Greiff explains, 
transitional justice initiatives offer the opportunity to create trust through 
action (De Greiff, 2008: 132). 
In the common framework of transitional justice by the 
international community, the healing of trauma and psychosocial 
services are not playing an important role, often due to very high costs. 
Neither the United Nations (UN) nor national governments usually foster 
processes of healing, forgiveness and reconciliation that would allow for 
a personal, spiritual transformation. This type of conflict transformation 
is much more linked with the grassroots, like faith-based or ethnic–
based organizations that acknowledge and work with the individual and 
collective healing for peace building. This is often based on localized 
approaches that are embedded in the communities and are a key factor for 
2 Backer, 2003: 302-305; Duthie, 2009; United Nations, 2006: 33–34.
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prevention of further violence and a more sustainable peace (Lederach, 
1997). Yet, in many post-conflict situations, the international community 
is lobbying and imposing a model of key tools in the transitional justice 
toolbox. What is thereby ignored is the importance of local ownership 
and civil society participation.
Civil society has a major impact on truth commissions, as 
their strength influences the debate on the mandate, the work of the 
commission and the dissemination of the final report. Without strong 
public pressure, it seems likely that spoilers undermine the overall 
transitional justice process (Stedman, 2001). Research shows that civil 
society actors have strategic options available to advance democratization. 
The information that civil society groups have collected, the contacts and 
local understanding that they have can be key for the success of a truth 
commission and the demand to expand its operations, like accessing 
government archives or the full cooperation of the government with the 
commission. Public hearings that are accompanied with media coverage 
can help to bring more awareness of the violations to the wider public 
(Taylor & Dukalskis, 2008: 682). Sometimes, the final report is not 
widely distributed and it depends on NGOs to actually allow for a wider 
distribution. In some instances though the commissions tried to keep a 
distant relationship with the human rights NGOs because they feared that 
parts of society that are linked with the security forces would perceive a 
bias. In turn, the NGOs themselves were frustrated that the commission 
was not working with and relying on them (Hayner, 2010: 223–225).
In the following, the case of Timor Leste is analyzed to study the 
impact of civil society participation before, during and after the work of 
a truth commission. First, a background about the violent Indonesian 
occupation of Timor Leste is provided, to have the context what human 
rights violations needed to be debunked. Also, the UN involvement and 
the processes leading up to the truth commission are discussed. Second, 
the work of the commission with its different strategies will be analyzed 
through the angle of civil society participation. Finally, the report and its 
recommendations are presented and why so little civil society support 
took place. 
JOHANNES LANGER
96
Perspectivas Internacionales
The Context of Human Rights Violations in Timor 
Leste
Timor Leste3 is located on a small island in Southeast Asia that got its full 
independence in 2002 after 24 years of armed struggle against Indonesia. 
Having a population of only 1.2 million people, the new country is 
characterized by ethnic heterogeneity and multiple languages (Strating, 
2014). After 400 years of Portuguese colonial rule, the 1974 Carnation 
revolution resulted in independence prospects for Timor Leste. New 
political parties were set up with different views upon the secession.4 
When the Portuguese authorities left the island, violent tensions led to 
a short civil war. The Timorese Social Democratic Association (ASDT), 
that later became known as the Revolutionary Front for an Independent 
East Timor (Fretilin), declared Timor Leste as an independent territory 
on 27 November 1975, although it only lasted for some days.
Indonesia invaded Timor Leste soon afterwards with the pretext 
of its fight against communism and the argument that the artificial 
separation of the island of Timor caused by colonial powers was finally 
over. Fretilin5 resisted the 24–year–long brutal Indonesian military 
occupation with an armed liberation struggle. The consequence was that 
up to one third of East Timorese were killed, particularly in the early 
years of the occupation. In the early 1990s, civil society started to resist 
the Indonesian leadership, whereby the student protests in 1991 led to 
the so–called Santa Cruz massacre, with more 271 students and youth 
killed and several hundred injured.
Next to those student protests, other youth organizations like the 
Catholic scouts and the Organization of Timorese Youth were critical 
3 This article refers to Timor Leste although the country is officially known in Portuguese as 
República Democrática de Timor Leste. During the time of the UN transition (2000–2002), the 
country was called East Timor, a name that is still used a lot in the literature in English. During 
Indonesian occupation the territory was named Timor Timur (1974–1999). Many Timorese 
actually used the Tetum expression Timor Lorosa’e.
4 The Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) and the Timorese Social Democratic Association 
(ASDT) were the biggest players: while the former longed for the relationship with Portugal to 
remain intact, the latter yearned for total independence.
5 The military wing of Fretelin is known as the Timorese National Liberation Army (Falintil).
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in the resistance (Wigglesworth, 2013: 54–56). During the 1990s, the 
international community became progressively aware of what occurred 
at the time in Timor. In 1996, the Hukum, Hak Asasi, dan Keadilan (HAK, 
in English: The Foundation for Law, Human Rights and Justice) was 
created, the first Timorese effort to establish a NGO working on human 
rights issues (Hunt, J. E. (2008)). A significant event for the international 
recognition of the resistance was the joint Nobel Peace Prize for the 
Catholic bishop Carlos Belo and a representative of Fretilin, José Ramos 
Horta, in 1996.
The economic recession that devastated Indonesia in 1998 led to 
the end of Suharto’s 31 years of presidency over Indonesia. His successor 
B. J. Habibie drastically changed Indonesia’s attitude towards Timor 
Leste and declared that the territory would have a referendum about 
its future, whether to receive autonomy or independence. Despite this 
announcement, the security situation deteriorated as newly created 
paramilitary groups joined existing ones and increased activities against 
pro-independence leaders, human rights activists, priests, students, 
and journalists. With the help of the UN, an independence referendum 
was held on 30 August 1999, with a 98.6 percent of turnout. Despite 
Indonesian intimidation, 78.5 percent voted for the independence of 
Timor Leste. As soon as the results were announced, a new wave of 
violence aroused that resulted in more than 1,000 people killed, 400,000 
displaced out of a total population of 890,000, and some 250,000 refugees 
in Indonesian–controlled West Timor. On top of this, havoc was wrecked 
on the infrastructure of Timor Leste, destroying between 70–80 percent 
of businesses and 50 percent of homes in the capital Dili (Pushkina & 
Maier 2012: 329).
The situation became so blatant, that the international community 
saw the necessity to intervene and after long diplomatic resistance, the 
Indonesian government accepted that the UN deployed a long–awaited 
peacekeeping operation that had the mandate to restore peace and security 
in Timor Leste while providing humanitarian assistance. The UN Security 
Council also established the United Nations Transitional Authority in 
East Timor (UNTAET), the largest multifunctional operation in UN 
history back then, which took over the administration of a country with 
no pre–existing institutions (Chawla, 2001). The principal objectives 
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were achieved as a secure environment was created, elections were held 
in August 2001 to convene a constitutional assembly, a constitution was 
developed, and the country came to full independence under its first 
president, Xanana Gusmão, in May 2002 (Harland, 2005).
However, critics point out that UNTAET preached about 
transparency, accountability and democracy as important values. 
However, in reality the UN mission gave at times the impression to be 
a somewhat authoritarian body, which treated the local population as 
victims rather than partners (Steele, 2002). Concerning the development 
of civil society, some 250 international NGOs arrived in the country 
between September 1999 until 2001 to work on emergency support 
and rehabilitation. Also many local CSOs were set up, yet normally 
lacking experience, human resources and skills. Most Timorese CSOs 
focused at the beginning on human rights and literally “exploded” from 
14 members in 1998 to 231 in early 2002 in the umbrella organization 
called NGO Forum (Wigglesworth, 2013: 60–61). Yet, the link of the UN 
and the international NGOs with local CSOs was often weak because of 
structural weaknesses of civil society in Timor Leste; therefore the official 
commitment to capacity building was often overridden with short–term 
policy goals, lacking the interest to actually invest in building up a strong 
civil society (Richmond & Franks, 2008: 194).
UNTAET, which essentially operated as the government then, 
had to establish a state “from scratch” because no political community 
existed (Brown, 2009: 149). Besides, the UN body was also responsible 
to administer a transitional justice order and as calls for an international 
tribunal were not realized, established the Special Panels of the Serious 
Crime Unit (SCU)6 that was part of the newly set–up Office of the General 
Prosecutor (OGP) with the aim to prosecute the major crimes, including 
torture and murder. The main weakness of the body was that no person 
outside East Timorese boundaries could be indicted, thus no Indonesian 
security forces or East Timorese who fled to Indonesia were sentenced. 
Consequently, the SCU could not deal with the “big fish” of gross human 
6 The SCU was an internationally mandated hybrid court that only convicted “serious crimes” 
committed in 1999. As Jakarta refused to extradite any perpetrator from its territory to East 
Timor, the SCU largely became irrelevant.
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rights violations; the most responsible were not brought to justice as a 
consequence, undermining the right to justice for East Timorese (Burgess, 
2004: 139–141). Moreover, only 84 individuals were held responsible for 
crimes of the 1999 violence, and almost all of the convicted received a 
pardon from the president in the following years (Robins, 2012).
The idea of a truth commission as well as an international inquiry 
into the violence surrounding the 1999 independence referendum was 
discussed by UNTAET, although Indonesia and its Asian allies in the UN 
blocked that proposal. The new local East Timorese political elite was also 
cautious as Xanana Gusmão stated in an interview already in March 1999 
while being under house arrest in Jakarta that he was against a possible 
truth and reconciliation commission in Timor Leste because it would be 
“too divisive” (Gorjão, 2001: 149). 
The East Timorese civil society organizations, like the Judicial 
System Monitoring Programme (JSMP), were during the time of 
UNTAET mostly focusing on justice issues. When the idea of a truth 
commission was coming up, it was viewed with suspicion because 
it was perceived as an amnesty tool for perpetrators. Yet, the Catholic 
Church and community leaders participated in workshops to consider 
transitional justice mechanisms, including a truth commission (CAVR, 
2006b: 3). Also the most renowned international NGO in the field, the 
New York–based International Center for Transitional Justice (ICJT) was 
involved, as in so many other transitional countries (Roosa, 2007/2008a: 
570). The renowned researcher on truth commissions, Priscilla B. Hayner, 
as well as the former executive secretary of the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, Paul van Zyl, participated in a workshop on 
9-10 October 2000 in the East Timorese capital Dili. They assisted Father 
Domingos Soares, chair of the Steering Committee on Reconciliation, to 
set up a truth and reconciliation commission in Timor Leste.
This Steering Committee comprised local and UN officials and 
hold consultations with grassroots organizations across all 13 districts of 
Timor Leste at all levels, receiving a lot of community support for a truth 
and reconciliation commission that eventually led to the creation of the 
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation —CAVR— (CAVR, 
2006b: 5–6). These consultations allowed the basis for successful work for 
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the CAVR,7 because there was a general sense that reconciliation and truth-
seeking was appropriate and even necessary. With these consultations, 
the CAVR was created and stood for one of the few exceptions where 
customary life and the local community was actually valued in the 
otherwise highly centralized country (Gorjão, 2001: 151). And yet, the 
CAVR was mostly promoted from the international community and not 
a demand from CSOs in Timor Leste. Local NGOs like HAK followed the 
process closely, but their main aim was an international tribunal and not 
a truth commission (Hunt, 2008: 166–167).
The Creation and Work of the CAVR
The relative impotence of both civil society and the UN influenced the 
form and timing of transitional justice in Timor Leste. That may not 
come as a surprise considering the circumstances as the country was 
basically lacking everything at the time. The priorities of civil society 
were sidelined who mostly focused on justice issues, particularly related 
with the crimes committed by Indonesian forces or the paramilitaries 
backed by them. The new East Timorese political elite preferred a policy 
of “forgive and forget,” in order to avoid damaging the relationship with 
the giant neighbor next door, Indonesia. It was clear for them that a 
survival of the new country would depend on good relations with the 
former occupier.
While many international advisors made sure that the truth 
commission would try to include lessons learned from other bodies 
around the world, civil society had relatively little to say. There were 
workshops organized for them, and Catholic father Domingos Soares was 
particularly active to lead it. The process of setting up the commission 
was therefore based on outside advice, and while there was no resistance 
to a truth commission, it was not a demand of local CSOs either. That is 
not to say that local CSOs were against a truth commission, but at the 
time large parts of the country were still in shambles of the scorched 
7 CAVR is the Portuguese acronym of Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação de 
Timor Leste.
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earth policy of Indonesia when they retreated after the independence 
referendum. A truth commission was thus just another exercise among 
many, which were going on at the same time and was not perceived to 
have the highest priority among many local CSOs. While the UN tried 
to build–up on existing NGOs, it was mostly international staff that was 
hired for key positions because of a generally low level of education. Thus, 
the UN followed the liberal peace building project, trying to implement 
democracy, human rights and market economy while local considerations 
were hardly considered (Richmond & Franks, 2008: 194).
An UNTAET regulation set–up the CAVR in July 2001 after an 
unanimous recommendation of the National Council of East Timorese 
Resistance (CNRT), an umbrella organization of basically all relevant East 
Timorese parties at the time. The main objective of the truth commission 
was to shed light on the violations of human rights committed from the 
Carnation Revolution in Portugal and the tensions between different 
political parties in Timor Leste in the mid–1970s, the long period of the 
Indonesian occupation and the 1999 violence around the independence 
referendum, in other words from April 1974 to October 1999.8 Originally 
set up for two years, the East Timorese government extended the 
mandate of the CAVR to overall 39 months due to three extensions 
(CAVR, 2006b: 6). In February 2002, the CAVR began working as an 
independent institution that would have no control or influence of 
neither the transitional government nor UNTAET (Järvinen, 2004: 56).
The CAVR was “unusual,” as Roosa points out, in a particular point 
and that was the absence of the occupying power (Indonesia). Usually, 
truth commissions are created on the basis of some kind of consent 
between different actors within one country. In contrast, the CAVR 
focused on human rights violations that were committed by Indonesia. 
Consequently, the main perpetrators —Indonesian army officers— could 
not undermine the work of the CAVR as spoilers. However, these very 
same perpetrators did not testify, thus reducing the impact of the CAVR’s 
8 More specifically, the CAVR covered the period from the start of Portugal’s Carnation 
Revolution on 25 April 1974 that started the decolonization process for East Timor as a 
Portuguese colony until the point where UNTAET established its peacekeeping mission and 
the administration of the eastern part of the island on 25 October 1999.
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work (Roosa, 2007/2008a: 564–565). Another aspect that needs to be 
addressed is that the CAVR was not “only” a truth and reconciliation 
commission, but also the word “reception” was added. The purpose of 
this concept was related to the fact that some East Timorese had fled in 
the chaos of the independence referendum and were worried to return, 
as many of them were involved in pro–Indonesian militias. The CAVR 
should also be a tool and symbol that East Timor would be forgiving to 
those that had been involved in less serious crimes. Only those directly 
responsible for murder would be put to the courts that were set up for the 
perpetrators.
Responsible for the work of the CAVR were seven national 
commissioners from East Timor (therefore no international 
commissioners were involved) and assisted by 29 regional commissioners. 
They were selected after a nation–wide consultation with a lot of input 
of CSOs that strengthened the process of the CAVR and established a 
good partnership from the beginning. The commissioners had the task 
to fulfill four mandates: 1) to establish the truth about human rights 
violations committed on all sides during the period from 1974 to 1999; 
2) to facilitate community reconciliation for less serious crimes; 3) to 
assist in restoring the human dignity of victims; and 4) to report on its 
work, inquiry, findings and recommendations (Walsh, 2012: 4). As a 
strategic decision, the former Comarca prison was chosen as the national 
office for the CAVR, because East Timorese political prisoners were kept 
there during the time of the Indonesian occupation (Järvinen, 2004: 57). 
Therefore, the national office served as a symbol for overcoming the 
repression that the East Timorese people experienced. In addition, four 
regional offices were installed (CAVR, op. cit.: 7).
The regulation required the CAVR to write a “comprehensive 
report, which sets out the Commission’s activities and findings, based 
on factual and objective information and evidence collected or received 
by it or placed at its disposal” (CAVR, 2006a: 4). The mandate of the 
CAVR included elements of legal practices (although these were not 
the standard procedures of criminal justice) with a mix of indigenous 
conflict resolution practices and lessons learnt from the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (although it was not allowed to 
grant amnesties). With respect to the indigenous practices, the CAVR 
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tried actively to avoid the gender discrimination that was part of the 
existing patriarchal system (Järvinen, op. cit.: 56). 
At the public hearings, topics were brought up that were not 
discussed beforehand in the public realm and gave victims voice to talk 
openly about human rights abuses. Overall, the CAVR conducted eight 
national hearings, 52 sub–district hearings (of 65 sub–districts in total) 
and 297 village level hearings. Among the issues were: 1) human rights 
violations committed by East Timorese political parties in the years 1974 
to 1976, 2) sexual violence as women were speaking up although there 
was a wide-held view that the East Timorese culture would not allow 
them to do so, and 3) the personal dimensions of the enduring violence 
of the Indonesian military during the time of the occupation (CAVR, 
2006b: 45). Many East Timorese politicians were implicated in the events 
in the 1970s and it was considered to be a big step forward that they 
described their version of what happened, including the difficult realities 
of the time that led to human rights abuses of all sides. The general 
aim was to hear and listen to the victims so that their dignity would be 
restored (CAVR, 2006a). 
Of particular interest in the CAVR was the grass–roots assistance 
with the aim that community reconciliation can take place (Babo Soares, 
2004; Belo Ximenes, 2004). This process happened with the community 
reconciliation process (CRP) that was based on local mechanisms on the 
bases of villages and should allow for the reintegration for perpetrators 
that had committed minor offences. The CRP was therefore a tool of 
restorative justice inside the framework of the CAVR (Nevins, 2007/2008). 
It was important for the CAVR to get the word out about their work, thus 
on a weekly basis a radio program was produced and broadcasted with 
different focuses on mandate–related topics, whereby most of them were 
related to the promotion of reconciliation (CAVR, 2006b: 7).
The reconciliation process was called “unique” because it was a 
bottom–up process based on traditional conflict resolution mechanism 
with voluntary involvement and included the public as well as local leaders 
and traditional elders (Pigou, 2004: 6). Overall, some 1,500 CRP were 
organized across the country allowing the participation of 40,000 people 
from August 2002 to March 2004 in community meetings. The character 
of the CRP was quasi–legal where deponents would provide their account 
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of what happened and provide the specific information about the time 
line and the location of events. Interviews showed that 96% stating, “the 
CRP had achieved its primary goal of promoting reconciliation in their 
community” (Horne, 2014: 27). The perpetrators were required to fully 
confess their involvement in the crimes they committed in front of the 
victim and the community at large. The panel of local leaders had then 
the task to broker an agreement in which the perpetrator would agree 
to fulfill some special actions related to the offence they had committed 
(Pigou, op. cit.: 26). 
Overall, 7,669 statements of victims, witnesses and perpetrators 
were collected by dozens of CAVR staff travelling across the country, 
in addition 91 in West Timor (Nannelli, 2009: 32). Roosa (op. cit., 
2007/2008b: 571–574) criticizes that the quality of the interviews varies 
a lot, thus undermining its usefulness for the final report. Besides the 
statements that were collected, also some 1,000 oral interviews were 
conducted by leading experts on the Indonesian and East Timorese 
history about special topics that they followed, particularly the Santa 
Cruz massacre of 1991, and the abduction of East Timorese children by 
the Indonesian military and forced displacement.
There was also some suspicion and reluctance to participate of local 
communities against the CRP in some areas because it was not necessarily 
clear how this process played into a tool that would mean for perpetrators 
that they would be sent to prison. On the one hand there was the fear that 
no justice would be done to the perpetrators, on the other hand CAVR staff 
was in a few occasions threatened because the local community reacted 
in a very hostile way to them, in the fear that they, as perpetrators, would 
face punishment (Pigou, op. cit.: 47). Overall, however, the large majority 
of communities welcomed the CAVR and cooperated actively, willingly 
and with a lot of interest. It really depended on the active engagement of 
regional commissioners with the local communities how many people 
participated and moved forward. According to the final report, the CRP 
made a “significant contribution” to reconciliation (Nevins, op. cit.: 600).
One of the contradictions of the prosecution process in East Timor 
was that the SCU worked very slowly. Therefore, many of those people 
who were denied to participate in the CRP because they were considered 
to have committed a “serious crime,” were in fact never prosecuted 
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by the SCU. As a consequence, those considered to have committed 
worse crimes, were —ironically— more likely to receive immunity. The 
perpetrators of “less serious crimes” resented the CRP process when they 
realized that those who committed “serious crimes” were not prosecuted. 
While victims were in general satisfied with the CRP process, they were 
much less so with the serious crimes procedures undermining the right 
for justice (Hirst & Varney, 2005: 13–15).
The CAVR Report and its Impact
In October 2005, the final report Chega! (Portuguese for ‘no more, stop, 
enough’) was published, containing 2,500 pages. The title was chosen 
because victims wanted that the violence would finally stop (CAVR, 
2006a: 3). The report should have been published in four languages 
(English, Indonesian (Bahasa), Tetum9 and Portuguese) although the full 
versions of the report are still not available in Portuguese and Tetum as of 
yet, despite the fact that they are the two official languages of the country. 
A Tetum version is available as a comic version and as a summary, but 
it was deemed to be too difficult to translate the whole document. As 
defined by its mandate, the CAVR came up with 204 recommendations, 
having the major weakness that they were not binding, thus the impact 
has been almost non–existent (CAVR, op. cit.: 10). Even worse, “since 
receiving the CAVR report, parliament has declined to debate it, let alone 
to act on its recommendations” (Robins, op. cit.: 89). Thus, the impact 
of the report was severely weakened, as the recommendations are a key 
part of an assumed possibility for reform and particularly reparations for 
victims. 
The CAVR seemed to have been conscious that it had a function 
to search for a “useable past” that would account for past human 
rights violation but not seek revenge. It was not the aim to write a new 
authoritative history of Timor Leste, but rather present multiple voices. 
Yet there was a dichotomy between the inclusion of non–elite perspectives 
9 Tetum is an Austronesian language spoken on the island of Timor and one of two official 
languages (next to Portuguese) in East Timor.
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and showing the complexities of the past while being usable for the future 
by creating internal unity and allow for good relations with Indonesia 
(Webster, 2007/2008: 582–583). The work of the CAVR has been praised 
because it allows for an enormous record of history produced, the voice 
of the East Timorese. As little written evidence of the violence during 
the Indonesian occupation existed, a major effort was achieved to collect 
multiple voices of all parts of Timor Leste. Chega! as the final report of 
the CAVR has contributed to the collective memory of Timor Leste with 
the “as a vehicle for the transmission of these narratives across time and 
space” (Nannelli, op. cit.: 40).
The Commission also expressed the necessity to continue its 
work that would allow recognizing and acknowledging the truth of 
what happened to achieve non–violence and reconciliation. Therefore, 
a new institution was set up in 2005, the post–CAVR secretariat to: 1) 
implement the recommendations of the CAVR report; 2) continue with 
reconciliation efforts in East Timor; and 3) the former Comarca prison 
should be transformed from being the national office of the CAVR into 
a national center for education that should commemorate the human 
rights violations and its victims and should house the CAVR archives 
as well (CAVR, 2006b: 54). While the post–CAVR secretariat indeed 
has been established in a former Indonesian detention center, it has 
blocked civil society initiatives to work with them, having a very narrow 
understanding of its mandate. ICTJ, for example, offered to distribute the 
report, but the secretariat rejected the proposal.
Chega! has been distributed to formal organizations like churches, 
donors, political parties and the international community and followed 
up with the local community in the time period of six months, from April 
to September 2006. Moreover, the post–CAVR secretariat produced at 
the beginning a weekly radio program on the report, invited community 
groups to visit the exhibition of Chega! and published a “plain guide to 
Chega!” that is a much shorter and comprehensive version of the final 
report (CAVR, 2006a: 2). In 2008, there was additionally a comic version 
of the report printed for children and for the many people with a low 
literacy rate in Timor Leste. However, the post–CAVR secretariat was not 
able, and it seems also not willing, to disseminate and advocate the report 
through different means. Consequently, the material did not reach the 
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audience, like teachers, community leaders or victims. In current debates 
about curriculum changes of history books, Chega! should finally find its 
place inside there. That also shows the weakness of civil society that did 
not demand a more pro–active approach of the post–CAVR secretariat, 
with the exception of international NGOs like ICTJ.
Although the CAVR wrote a massive report, the impact has not 
been very strong. Indonesia has dismissed the report, but also the major 
power centers in the world like Washington or London have not paid 
attention to it. Even inside Timor Leste, there was hardly any impact, if 
any. Even politicians favorable to the work of the CAVR, like Ramos Horta 
and Gusmão were not backing up the final report. The call for reparations 
in the report has not been fulfilled as of yet by East Timorese politicians, 
thus many East Timorese were frustrated because their participation did 
not materialize in economic support of the new government. Moreover, 
the report has not been widely distributed (Hayner, op. cit.: 42), many 
people are not aware of Chega! and there is very little knowledge of 
CAVR’s recommendations. Overall, there was relatively little follow–
up on the recommendations. While the East Timorese government 
claimed that “many” recommendations were already implemented, 
in fact human rights groups claim that not a single one has been even 
touched so far. In short, in any policy proposal, politicians do not refer 
to the recommendations. Some initiatives, like Chega Ba Ita (ACBIT) 
are working on the dissemination of the report, although the impact is 
limited.
What the CAVR provided for the victims though, argues Guthrey 
(2015), is voice and a sense of healing. This is done through getting 
the message out, not even to the rest of Timor Leste but in fact to the 
entire world that is linked to a sense of empowerment. She also found 
some sense of relief to speak out, although Hayner argues that in truth 
commissions across the world, mixed results can be found (Hayner, op. 
cit.). The acknowledgement of crimes also helped to get support, inside 
the family and particularly the wider community. However, Guthrey also 
found that shaming was the result of the truth-telling, particularly for 
women when it comes to sexual violence (Guthrey, op. cit.). In fact, even 
retraumatization is possible, as Brounéus already discussed in the case of 
Rwanda with the Gacaca courts (Brounéus, 2008).
JOHANNES LANGER
108
Perspectivas Internacionales
Finally, as it happens with many truth commissions, the resources 
were limited, expectations were too high and many different, even 
contradictory agendas influenced the creation and the work of the CAVR. 
The process of obtaining the information has mostly been based on 
individual memory, the oral interviews being a methodological exception. 
The truth inside Chega! surely is not impartial or objective; however, 
it is a vital source for nation–building, reconciliation and restorative 
justice. As Kent shows, the CAVR did not satisfy the demand for justice 
for local communities (Kent, 2012). They set up consequently their own 
initiatives to construct memorial, create victims’ support groups and gain 
political recognition of their suffering during the Indonesian occupation 
and beyond. These “unofficial memory practices” that are bottom–up 
approached and based on their own Timorese culture with believes that 
ancestors are restructuring society (Ibídem, 174). 
Conclusions
Civil society involvement is difficult to achieve in countries that come out 
of devastating violence and destruction. Transitional justice mechanisms 
were not so much the primary concern in Timor Leste in comparison to 
the reconstruction of the country. Even more so, concerns about justice 
in Timor Leste and not so much truth–telling guided demands of human 
rights groups and other CSOs at the time, including the Catholic Church. 
Although the CAVR tried hard to involve CSOs in the set-up of the 
commission as well as the selection of the commissioners, there was not 
much involvement or pressure of CSOs during CAVR’s work.
A particular mistake of the CAVR was that CSOs were not involved 
in the writing of recommendations, which is related to the rush of coming 
up with them in the last minute. That might have been of the factors why 
hardly any civil society group stood up for Chega! or disseminated its 
products so people would be aware about the findings of the final report. 
The question comes up whether the truth commission came too early for 
Timor Leste and it would have been better to wait some time when basic 
reconstruction efforts were finished. However, Hayner argues that it is 
critical that the momentum of transition should be used because there 
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is more political space to do the exercise and the evidence is still fresh 
(Hayner, op. cit.: 111). The only demand that was taken over by CSOs 
was the reparation for victims, although this point did not have much 
influence either on politicians who only made sure that veteran fighters 
secured a pension and other benefits (ICTJ, 2010).
Participatory approaches are difficult to achieve in post–conflict 
settings where the state is in the making. The consequence, however, is 
a top–down approach in the creation of collective memory. An active 
involvement of CSOs would imply that there is pressure and ownership 
of citizens of the transitional justice processes. That was not the case in 
Timor Leste. It would be critical for future exercises that the CSOs are 
actively listened to and commissioners provide space for civil society 
to help shaping its work. That seems to be a critical tool and will allow 
that civil society is actively consulted in drafting the recommendations 
in the final report for the state. Such involvement can help to bring 
about ownership of the truth–telling process, as CSOs more likely will 
lobby and pressure the government afterwards to actually implement the 
recommendations and contribute to the no–repetition of violence and an 
end to impunity.
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